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Introduction
China has recorded unprecedentedly 
high growth rates since 1978, when 
the central government undertook 
significant reforms to industrialize and 
open up the economy with a dual-track 
system comprised of “market-economy” 
and “plan-economy” segments for 
each market. The central government 
has also adopted an export-oriented 
growth strategy. Despite the well-known 
widening income inequality, China not 
only grew remarkably in this period but 
also succeeded in saving about a half 
billion of its citizens out of absolute 
poverty, at an unseen scale in the history 
as we know it.1 With high growth rates 
averaging about 10 % since the late 
1990s, the size of the Chinese economy 
surpassed Japan in nominal terms in 
2010 to become the second largest 
economy in the world following the 
United States. At the same time, China 
also overtook Germany to become the 
largest exporter. The London-based 
journal The Economist drew an analogy 
between China’s growing share in total 
world exports, rising incredibly to more 
than 10 %, and the heydays of Britain 
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mid-1990s, it was believed that some 
East and Southeast Asian countries 
had discovered a recipe for economic 
development and industrialization 
different from the one in the West. 
Many researchers have examined how 
the East and Southeast Asian economies 
have developed and industrialized 
successfully within a short period of 
time. However, with the slump of the 
Japanese economy after the bubble 
burst of the early 1990s and the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997-1998, this respect 
turned into disappointment and harsh 
criticism of the capitalistic development 
experiences of these countries. With the 
declining importance of Japan and the 
newly industrializing Asian economies 
in the world economy after the 1990s, 
the interest in East Asia faded, but the 
rise of China in the global economic 
stage attracted the attention again to 
the eastern part of Asia. This time, 
researchers were to examine how this 
country, which produced the concept 
of a socialist market economy in 1992, 
grew very fast. The aim of the central 
government is to turn China into an 
industrial economy like its neighbours 
Japan and Korea. 
This paper examines this high 
economic growth and its slowdown in the 
near future by taking into consideration 
future projections and political economy 
considerations along with implications 
for global rebalancing. Special emphasis 
is put on the need to transform the 
in the 19th century when Britain as 
the top exporter in the world directed 
world trade flows.2 Economists generally 
agree that the government’s export-led 
growth and industrialization strategy, 
accompanying foreign exchange policy, 
and foreign direct investments attracted 
into China have facilitated this high 
growth performance.3
The World Bank has recently reported 
that China will join the list of high-
income countries in 15-20 years.4 An 
implication of this statement is that 
China will be able to overcome the 
middle-income trap. If this happens, 
it is likely that China will be a success 
story to learn from for countries 
trapped in the middle income levels, 
such as Turkey is now, and researchers 
will seek to draw lessons from China’s 
experiences. In the same vein, during 
the period from the 1960s to the 
China has recorded 
unprecedentedly high growth 
rates since 1978, when the 
central government undertook 
significant reforms to 
industrialize and open up the 
economy with a dual-track 
system comprised of “market-
economy” and “plan-economy” 
segments for each market.
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as the BRICs, reached their limit of 
rapid growth and they could no longer 
serve as the growth engine for the 
world economy.5 However, this should 
not be taken negatively. The Economist 
emphasizes an important detail: among 
the top 100 fastest supercomputers in 
the world not a single one belonged to 
the BRICs in 1997, but in 2013 six of 
them were in China and another six in 
the rest of the BRICs. The striking fact 
is that China’s Tianhe-2 supercomputer 
topped the list. It is evident from this 
comparison that the technological gap 
between China and the forerunning 
advanced economies has been closing 
during the course of rapid growth. 
Obviously, China has fully exploited 
the opportunities of rapid growth 
through technology acquisition and 
emulation, which were once believed 
to be important sources of growth. 
It is now in a position to create new 
technologies.6
pattern of economic growth from one 
dominated by capital accumulation to 
one emphasizing private consumption. 
To this end, a simple quantitative analysis 
is employed to discuss the implications 
of investment-led or consumption-led 
growth strategies. The accompanying 
policies and the essential restructuring 
especially in the financial sector have also 
been discussed in depth. 
Economic Growth in China 
and Its Sources
The average annual growth rate of 
real GDP in China during the period 
1995-2010 was an incredible 9.9 %. 
Figure 1 shows that the economic 
growth rate accelerated after 1999, 
reached 14.2 % in 2007, and slowed 
down after 2007 due to the global 
financial crisis. However, despite the 
decline, the economic growth rate 
was still in the vicinity of 9-10 % 
following the crisis. Thanks to China’s 
high growth performance, the world 
economy was able to record positive 
growth rates during this period, 
effectively raising China to the status 
of the saviour of the world economy. 
China was joined by Brazil, Russia, 
and India as the newly emerging 
high-growth economies. On the other 
hand, the Economist reported in 2013 
that despite their high growth rates 
compared to the advanced countries, 
these four countries, commonly called 
With the declining importance 
of Japan and the newly 
industrializing Asian economies 
in the world economy after the 
1990s, the interest in East Asia 
faded, but the rise of China 
in the global economic stage 
attracted the attention again to 
the eastern part of Asia.
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is the case for many countries), if the 
growth in total expenditures (i.e., GDP) 
in an economy is not resulting mainly 
from private consumption, then it has to 
be either because of investments or net 
foreign expenditures (i.e., exports), or a 
combination of the two. The sustainability 
of either of these two expenditure items 
in GDP over long periods of time is 
doubtful. In the case of China, except 
for certain years, the contribution of 
fixed investments to economic growth 
has exceeded 50 % after 2001. To put it 
differently, it is observed that households 
in China are not spending much and 
firms are investing heavily to expand their 
production capacities and capital stocks. 
That is to say, Chinese firms have spared 
about half of their production to add more 
to their production capacity in order to be 
able produce more in the future. 
Understanding the main sources of 
economic growth is as important as 
understanding the trends in economic 
growth. The simplest way to do this is to 
decompose the growth in real GDP into 
its expenditure (demand) components, 
namely, private consumption 
expenditures of households, public 
consumption expenditures, fixed capital 
investments, and net exports, as shown 
in Table 1. The figures in the table 
reveal the percentage contribution of the 
expenditure components to economic 
growth. The most striking observation 
is the reduction in the share of private 
consumption expenditures from 49 % 
in 1995 to 30 % band after 2001. By 
no means is this a desirable or healthy 
situation for economic growth, for the 
following reason. If we assume that public 
expenditures do not change much as 
a share of GDP in the long-run (which 



































































Data source: UN National Accounts Database, at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/selbasicFast.asp (last 
visited 15 June 2015).
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capital stock will continue. Investments 
in China have been undertaken by 
domestic firms and recently by foreign 
investors. It is understood that until 
recently most of the foreign-owned 
firms aimed to increase exports to the 
home country. According to the official 
data published in the China Statistical 
Yearbook, foreign-owned firms (wholly-
foreign-owned and majority-foreign-
owned firms altogether) produced about 
Fixed investments (i.e., investments in 
physical capital stocks such as machinery, 
equipment, vehicles, buildings, and so 
on) can boost economic growth only 
if they are profitable enough to attract 
necessary funds. As long as the returns 
to investments are high enough for 
private capital owners who base their 
expectations mainly on future income 
streams and profit prospects of given 
investment projects, additions to 









1995 49 -3 55 -1 100
1996 48 13 34 5 100
1997 25 13 19 44 100
1998 39 18 27 16 100
1999 52 24 24 0 100
2000 45 23 23 9 100
2001 33 18 50 -1 100
2002 34 12 49 5 100
2003 29 8 64 -1 100
2004 32 9 56 3 100
2005 23 16 40 21 100
2006 28 13 45 14 100
2007 29 12 44 16 100
2008 32 13 48 8 100
2009 33 11 83 -27 100
2010 29 15 54 2 100
2011 39 18 49 -6 100
2012 38 15 50 -3 100
2013 44 12 50 -6 100
Data source: UN National Accounts Database, at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/selbasicFast.asp) (last 
visited 15 June 2015).
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of long-run economic growth. One is 
the accumulation of inputs (production 
factors) used in production such as 
labour, including human capital, and 
physical capital stock. The former can be 
accumulated through population growth 
and extensive education. The latter can 
be accumulated through expanding 
production facilities, such as building a 
new factory, purchasing new machines, 
and so on. The second source of growth 
is the improvement in the efficiency of 
using these inputs, named total factor 
productivity. Improvements in efficiency 
such as organizational innovations in 
firms, research and development activities, 
and advancement of technologies and 
production techniques are some examples 
of how to improve the overall productivity 
of production factors.9
These two sources of growth are 
also bound by some features of the 
accumulation of production factors. 
One is the diminishing returns to 
the accumulation of physical capital. 
According to the mainstream economic 
theory, which dominates economic 
thinking in the modern world, a country 
cannot continue accumulating physical 
capital without facing decreasing returns. 
At the earlier stages of development, it is 
reasonable to expect a country to build 
more industrial facilities during the 
course of industrialisation. However, the 
return to physical investments will get 
lower over time. When capital is scarce, 
its return will naturally be higher. When 
10 trillion yuan worth of output in 2009, 
a figure comparable to 15 trillion yuan 
by state- owned owned enterprises, and 
accounted for about 50-55 % of total 
exports from China since 2000. However, 
as the Economist demonstrates, recently, 
these firms are increasingly becoming 
interested in expanding their business 
operations in the Chinese domestic 
market7 thanks to the rapidly growing 
middle-class in China. According to an 
influential study by Kharas and Gertz, 
the size of the middle class in China was 
about 157 million, roughly 12 % of the 
population, in 2009.8 They predict the 
percentage share of the middle class in 
China to reach 70 % by 2030.
Many economists point out that the 
extraordinarily high share of investments 
in GDP, as high as 50 %, in China is not 
sustainable. Their reasoning is based on a 
technique named “growth accounting”. 
This technique, in its simplest form, 
postulates that there are two major sources 
Improvements in efficiency such 
as organizational innovations in 
firms, research and development 
activities, and advancement of 
technologies and production 
techniques are some examples 
of how to improve the overall 
productivity of production 
factors.
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technological capabilities may 
support economic growth. Therefore, 
investments in new technologies and 
technology transfer from advanced 
economies are important. For China 
this is especially important in the age 
of the Knowledge Economy, which 
is characterized by extensive use of 
knowledge-intensive technologies and 
techniques in almost every economic 
activity and the comparative advantages 
of countries and firms are based on 
knowledge absorption and creation 
capacity. This requires an effective 
design of science and technology policies 
and national innovation systems for 
technology creation and diffusion. The 
government is aware of the essentialness 
of technological development. In the 
12th Five-Year Plan covering the years 
2011-2015, scientific development 
was emphasized as a primary objective 
and the promotion of innovation via 
indigenous sources was a focus. The 
plan had envisaged increasing research 
and development expenditures as a 
percentage of GDP beyond 1.75 %.11 
In the preparation of the 13th Five-Year 
Plan (2016-2020), innovation and the 
promotion of scientific development 
have been raised as priority issues.12 
Comparing China with advanced 
economies, China ranked second in 
2014 in total research and development 
spending (about US$ 280 billion) after 
the US (US$ 460 billion) and ranking 
above Japan, Germany and the UK.13 
capital becomes abundant (i.e., when 
the economy reaches a higher or more 
advanced level of industrialisation), 
the reverse will hold and returns will 
get lower. The same argument applies 
also to labour. In effect, the first source 
of economic growth based on the 
accumulation of production factors will 
be out-dated when the economy matures. 
This leaves efficiency improvement as the 
only viable option to increase or sustain 
economic growth rate in the long run. 
This is the healthiest way to grow over 
the long term.
The necessity of the second source 
of growth, however, does not entirely 
single out the first source for developing 
economies like China. A combination 
of both might work as well. It might 
be possible for a country to increase 
its physical capital stock and labour 
endowment in the long run while 
improving the efficiency of using these 
resources. For instance, the experiences 
of China and Korea have proved that 
increasing the education level and skills 
of the labour force pay off well in the 
long run.10 Similarly, the physical capital 
stock of a country can be expanded 
by mobilizing domestic and foreign 
sources of entrepreneurship. However, 
the returns to both labour and physical 
capital will decrease over time and the 
contribution of both labour and capital 
to economic growth will diminish. On 
the other hand, improving the quality of 
capital and labour by way of upgrading 
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Such high national savings rates as 50 
% are not sustainable. 
There are various reasons for such high 
savings rates. Ge and Yang have shown 
that one reason for high household 
saving rate is the insufficiency of the 
social security system in China.14 Since 
people need to save for their retirement 
years, a large part of savings may result 
from old age pension needs. Another 
important reason is the requirement 
of down payments when purchasing 
a house, 30 % of the price for the first 
house purchased. For many people, 
purchasing a house for their families 
is an important target in life. On the 
other hand, the central government 
has introduced various measures since 
2008 to regulate house prices, and the 
downpayments have been raised to 
40 % of the price of the house for the 
purchase of the second house.15 After 
gradually raising it to 60 %, in late 
2014 the government equalized the 
downpayments for both types of houses, 
essentially making it easier for people 
to purchase for investment purposes.16 
Currently, household saving rates are 
high but with the increase in per capita 
income in the future, it is reasonable 
to expect this saving rate to decrease 
as people will demand higher living 
standards and readjust their spending 
accordingly. It is also expected that the 
Chinese government will improve the 
social security system in response to the 
demands from the growing middle class. 
Rethinking the economic growth 
experience of China within mainstream 
economic theory, productivity 
improvement and productivity-led 
growth are highly desirable to sustain 
growth rates at relatively high levels. 
China’s potential growth rate will 
decline from 10 % to lower levels (5-7 
%) in the near future but even such 
growth rates are unimaginably high for 
advanced countries due to the maturity 
achieved by such economies. On the side 
of physical capital accumulation, it is 
also important to consider how this will 
be financed. Funds for physical capital 
investments are largely provided by 
domestic sources, namely households, 
government, and enterprises, in the 
form of savings. Like high investment 
to GDP ratio, China also has high 
national savings to GDP ratio, around 
50 %. National savings are made up of 
household savings, government savings 
(roughly equal to budget surplus), 
corporate savings, and net foreign 
savings (inflow of foreign capital minus 
outflow of domestic savings abroad). 
Currently, household saving 
rates are high but with the 
increase in per capita income 
in the future, it is reasonable to 
expect this saving rate to decrease 
as people will demand higher 
living standards and readjust 
their spending accordingly. 
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to increase to higher levels and the 
government wants this ratio to decline), 
the only possibility is a decline in the 
efficiency of investments, which implies 
a lower economic growth rate.19 In other 
words, the cost of a high savings rate and 
hence high investment rate will manifest 
itself as lower GDP growth in the near 
future.20
While China is sparing half of its GDP 
for investments to increase physical 
capital stock, and given the expectation 
that the returns to these investments 
will decline in the future, household 
consumption expenditures will become 
important as a source of economic 
growth. Therefore, domestic demand-
led growth is a viable option for China. 
In fact, recent statements by the Chinese 
government emphasize the desire of the 
government to realize a transformation 
from investment-led economic growth 
to consumption-led economic growth.21 
It is worth noting here that much of 
the investments are realized by state-
owned-enterprises, which are funded 
by loans from the domestic banks, and 
smaller enterprises find it difficult to 
access to funds and are forced to obtain 
these funds from the shadow banking 
system at higher interest rates. Historical 
statistics for advanced economies reveal 
that when economies mature, domestic 
demand becomes the propelling force 
for economic growth. There are two 
possible sources of spending, increase in 
the number of consumers and increase 
On the other hand, there are historical 
examples from other countries that 
improvement in social security system 
may not bring about decline in savings 
rate. For instance, in the 1970s and 1980s 
Japan did not experience a significant 
reduction in the saving rates despite the 
improvements and adjustments in the 
social security system.17
Using macroeconomics we can trace 
the relationship between investments, 
capital stock, and GDP with a simple 
equation as shown by Kazuo Sato.18 
The equation in the footnote states 
that investment to GDP ratio increases 
with higher capital-output ratio and 
higher efficiency of investments. When 
the supply of funds (savings) is larger 
than the demand for these funds, it is 
necessary to decrease the demand, i.e., 
investment to GDP ratio. However, 
policymakers are also concerned about 
the economic growth rate, which may 
decline due to slow-down in investment 
demand. Then, if economic growth will 
not decline, the capital-output ratio 
should decline assuming the efficiency 
of investments remains the same. Using 
data from Penn World Tables, we can 
examine the case of China. Figure 2 
shows the estimated capital-output ratio 
in China for the post-reform period of 
1978-2011. Capital-output ratio has 
increased since the late 1990s and this 
gave rise to increasing investment to 
GDP ratio. Even to keep this ratio at 
its current level (since it is not desirable 
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because this will reduce savings arising 
from insufficient social security. The 
Chinese government already possesses 
enough funds to be used for this purpose, 
mostly through large tax revenues 
collected thanks to high economic 
growth and through enlarging official 
reserves thanks to large trade surpluses.
in consumers’ incomes. Then, increase in 
spending is necessary given the limited 
population growth in China due to 
the government’s strict population 
policy. How to increase income levels 
of consumers is an important policy 
question. Improvement in the social 
security system will surely help increase 
private consumption expenditures 



























































Data source: Penn World Tables, at http://febpwt.webhosting.rug.nl/Dmn/AggregateXs/VariableCodeSelect 
(last visited 15 June 2015).
Another important variable to 
consider about investments is the cost of 
funds channelled towards investments. 
According to official statistics, the real 
interest rate in China has remained at 
significantly low levels. Figure 3 shows 
the trend in real interest rates in China on 
an annual basis computed by deducting 
the inflation rate (calculated using the 
consumer price index) from the officially 
announced nominal interest rates. An 
interpretation of the low real interest 
rates is that the cost of undertaking 
investments was relatively low in China. 
In certain years, the real interest rate was 
even negative. 
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of the findings in the paper are based on 
background papers. Therefore, the data 
in the report should be taken seriously.
Table 2 shows, using the World Bank’s 
projections, that the growth rate of the 
labour force in China is projected to 
decrease over time and even turn negative 
after 2015. In other words, demographic 
dynamics in China demonstrate that the 
population growth rate will slow down 
and the size of the labour force will reach 
a level of saturation. This is obviously 
related with the one-child policy of the 
government implemented since the late 
1970s. It is projected that the economic 
growth rate will not be at the two-digit 
levels and will drop gradually to around 
5 % by 2030. Furthermore, labour 
Future of Economic Growth 
in China
Understanding the future of economic 
growth is important. The World 
Bank’s report China 2030: Building 
a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative 
Society evaluates prospects for economic 
growth in China with projections for 
economic growth until 2030.22 There is 
also information about the intentions 
and projections of the government 
in the Chinese government’s official 
documents especially those of the five-
year plans. Table 2 highlights these 
projections. It is worth noting here that 
this report was prepared in cooperation 
with the Chinese government and most 





















































Note: Computed by deducting the Central Bank’s official interest rate for deposits from the annual inflation 
rate. 




services expenditures will make up about 
50 % of GDP after 2015 and slightly 
above 60 % by 2030. The 12th Five-Year 
Plan (2011-2015) envisaged an average 
GDP growth for 2011-2015 of 7 %, share 
of services in GDP to reach 43 %, and 
research and development expenditures 
at 2.2 % of the economy.23 According 
to the World Bank World Development 
Indicators Database, annual average 
growth rate for 2011-2013 was 8.2 %, 
the share of services in GDP in 2013 
was 46 %, research and development 
expenditures amounted to 2.0 % of GDP 
in 2013. Based on the projections in the 
five-year plan and the actual realizations, 
there is a strong reason to believe that the 
World Bank’s projections in Table 2 may 
be realized. As economic development 
progresses, expenditures on services such 
as education, health, finance, transport, 
communication, and various other 
domestic services will naturally increase.
productivity growth rate will surpass 
economic growth rate after 2015. The 
meaning of labour productivity growth 
rates below economic growth rates 
before 2015 is declining share of labour 
in national income. Looking at the 
projections for the post-2015 period, 
it can safely be assumed that increasing 
labour productivity should affect real 
wage and household income positively. 
In this case, increasing purchasing power 
of households shall increase private 
consumption expenditures and their share 
in GDP. This is one of the top priorities 
of the Chinese government. The share of 
private consumption in GDP is projected 
to rise to over 60 % gradually after 2015, 
reaching about two thirds of GDP by 
2030. This is yet a very ambitious target 
for the government. On the other hand, 
the projection for the share of services 
sector in total consumption to increase in 
the near future is a positive indicator in 
favour of this target. Table 2 reveals that 











GDP growth rate 9.9 8.6 7.0 5.9 5.0
Growth rate of the labour force 0.9 0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.4
Growth rate of labour productivity 8.9 8.3 7.1 6.2 5.5
Investment to GDP ratio 49 42 38 36 34
Ratio of consumption expenditures in GDP 47 56 60 63 66
Ratio of the industrial sector in GDP 46.7 43.8 41.0 38.0 34.6
Ratio of the services sector in GDP 43.1 47.6 51.6 56.1 61.1
Note: The figures for 1995-2010 refer to actual data and the figures for 2011-2030 refer to projections. 
Source: The World Bank and Development Research Centre of the State Council, the People’s Republic of 
China, China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative Society, 2013, p. 9.
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overinvestment and excess capacity 
are big obstacles to economic growth. 
This issue has a political dimension 
as well because most of the largest 
industrial producers, for instance in the 
steel industry which is suffering from 
overcapacity, are linked to the local 
governments whose main objective is to 
increase industrial production although 
the National Development and Reform 
Commission has been trying to shut 
down inefficient industrial facilities.26 
In the case of financing of the physical 
investments, it is necessary to evaluate the 
efficiency in the capital markets whose 
major function in a modern economy 
is to transfer loanable funds of savers 
to profitable investment projects. There 
is a large volume of research examining 
the causes and consequences of the 
inefficiencies and imperfectness of capital 
markets in China.27 Two of the commonly 
accepted policy recommendations to 
improve the efficiency in the financial 
markets in China are the removal of 
financial restraint policy adopted by 
the central government and taking 
necessary actions to deepen the capital 
markets, particularly via the provision of 
incentives to facilitate the diversification 
of financial assets that the savers can 
invest their funds in. The next section 
discusses the structure of the financial 
markets and their impact on economic 
growth in China. 
Another important indicator to 
be evaluated carefully in Table 2 is 
the share of investments in national 
income. According to the projections, 
it is expected to decline to about 34 % 
by 2030. It is then safe to assume that 
the capital-output ratio will stay almost 
steady after some time. If the capital-
output ratio stays unchanged, one can 
find, based on the analysis in the previous 
section, that investments will grow only 
at the same rate as the growth rate of 
the economy.24 This is a very important 
finding with strong policy implications. 
A short-cut interpretation in light of 
the expressions above, it is understood 
from an analysis of the projections that 
physical investments in the Chinese 
economy will attain a level of saturation. 
A natural consequence of this is excess 
capacity in certain industries such as 
steel.25 Investments will therefore have 
to fall in such industries unless demand 
increases, probably through exports to 
reduce the demand-supply gap. Yet, 
It is understood from the 
analysis of the projections that 
physical investments in the 




joint-stock banks) controlled about 
83 % of commercial bank assets in the 
country.29 Foreign institutions were 
allowed only a negligibly small piece of 
the cake (2 percent of total assets). Loans 
extended by the banking system, which 
is dominated by public banks, amounted 
to about 55 % of the financial sector in 
2014, and the shares of stocks traded and 
corporate and government bonds were 
about 26 and 19 %, respectively.30 In 
short, China has a bank-based financial 
system. Among the BRIC countries, 
which China can be compared with, this 
is peculiar only to China.31 
In the rapidly growing Chinese 
economy, the financial system has been 
operating basically as follows: households 
deposit their savings in the banking 
system (mostly in public banks) whose 
interest rates are determined and kept 
artificially low by the central government, 
and the banking system directs these low-
cost funds mostly to private firms and 
local governments as loans. In a sense, 
Financial Sector and 
Sustainability of Economic 
Growth
From the beginning, the role of the 
financial system in China was to provide 
the funds needed for the large-scale 
industrial investments of public and 
private enterprises in accordance with the 
central government’s industrialization 
agenda.28 This is comparable with the 
role played by the financial systems in 
latecomer developmentalist or etatist 
economies in East Asia such as Japan 
and Korea. However, with the increasing 
share of China in the world economy, 
the financial system has evolved into a 
more market-oriented and competitive 
one. The financial system in China was 
able to provide these funds to investors 
at a relatively low cost. Investments 
financed this way were instrumental in 
rapid industrialization and sustaining 
rapid growth rates. On the other hand, as 
explained above, due to the expectations 
that China would follow a different 
growth path by adopting a different 
growth strategy and the growth rates 
would be fairly low, such changes should 
have important consequences for capital 
markets and trigger significant changes 
in the working and organization of these 
markets. 
In 2010 the Chinese government 
directly (through public banks) and 
indirectly (through its shares in the 
Chinese banks, like their 
Japanese counterparts in the 
past, are able to collect funds 
from national savings easily and 
at fairly low cost and there is an 
argument that, similar to the 
Japanese banks, these banks are 
also weakly structured.
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international standards such as Basel 
Accord capital adequacy criteria imposed 
on banks engaging in international capital 
transactions. Moreover, bold steps have 
also been taken to develop the securities 
markets in the country. The details of such 
developments in the financial markets can 
be found elsewhere.35 While these reforms 
aim at further financial deepening, their 
results are yet to be seen. 
State control and repression of the 
financial sector is still continuing and 
is a matter of concern. The central 
government in China has naturally 
and reasonably deemed the financial 
sector an integral part of its growth and 
development strategy and is reluctant 
to leave it largely to market forces. The 
state-owned banks still control a large 
part of the banking sector and the 
economic decision-making process in 
these banks is based on bureaucratic and 
political criteria rather than commercial 
criteria. Many economists argue that the 
allocation of available funds in such a way 
leads to inefficient resource allocation in 
the economy. 
this is reminiscent of Japanese private 
banks in their heydays during the high-
growth era.32 The Ministry of Finance in 
Japan controlled private banks and forced 
them to direct the savings of households 
to large manufacturing firms and their 
subsidiaries under the ministry’s guidance. 
During the course of the liberalization of 
the banking system in Japan during and 
after the 1990s, the weak structure of these 
banks has become apparent.33 Chinese 
banks, like their Japanese counterparts 
in the past, are able to collect funds from 
national savings easily and at fairly low 
cost and there is an argument that, similar 
to the Japanese banks, these banks are also 
weakly structured. During rapid growth 
and in the absence of competition in the 
domestic financial system, common to 
both countries, these weaknesses are not 
visible or can be ignored.
The Chinese government seems to be 
aware of the weaknesses in the Chinese 
financial system and it has recently 
initiated reforms to restructure the 
finance sector, and the banking sector 
in particular.34 First, the restrictions on 
interest rates set by the government have 
recently been relaxed. Regulations in the 
financial sector have also been eased and 
entry into the financial sector has been 
made easier to enhance competition. 
In addition, due to the fact that the 
international transactions of Chinese 
banks have increased enormously over 
the last decade in particular, it was 
necessary for these banks to achieve 
The central government in China 
has naturally and reasonably 
deemed the financial sector an 
integral part of its growth and 
development strategy and is 




Excessive dependence on banks for 
funds is generally regarded as risky 
because in the event of a banking crisis 
the repercussions on the real economy 
will be extremely harsh. As economic 
development progresses, the demand 
for services provided by non-bank 
financial institutions such as insurance 
companies, securities companies, 
pension funds, etc. are also expected 
to increase. Mainstream economists 
generally advise deepening the financial 
system by encouraging the development 
of non-bank financial markets such as 
bonds and financial derivative markets. 
Considering the excessive dependence 
of local governments on bank loans for 
investment expenditures and soft budget 
practices, there are concerns about the 
role banks play in the economy, which 
is normally expected to be monitoring of 
risk and channelling savings to profitable 
investment projects. For this to happen 
in China, it is essential to adopt free 
market principles. In the Third Plenary 
Meeting of the 18th Central Committee 
of the Communist Party of China, which 
ended on 12 November 2013, the party 
decided to increase the role of the market 
and improve the working of the market 
mechanism in the economy.36 The World 
Bank argues in an official report that 
reform in the financial system in China 
is needed also because it is important to 
correct the imperfections in the financial 
sector along with the development of 
the real economy.37 It is implied that 
the imperfect capital market in China 
dominated by state-owned banks creates 
an idiosyncratic risk in itself and the costs 
arising from this risk may be larger than 
the benefits obtained from rapid growth 
and industrialization it facilitates. To put 
in other words, the weaknesses in the 
financial system may have been ignored, 
downgraded or even gone unnoticed.
The World Bank warns that if economic 
growth continues with the current state 
of the financial sector characterized by 
imperfections and risks without any 
reforms, domestic balances may be hurt 
severely.38 This may bear significant 
costs to the economy in the form of 
further worsening income inequalities, 
reduction in productivity, and worsening 
competitiveness. Therefore, it argues 
that China urgently needs to undertake 
financial sector reforms. Relating this with 
the need to transform long-run economic 
growth strategy to a productivity-based 
one with an emphasis on innovation 
and entrepreneurship, it is reasonable to 
believe that building a financial sector 
that rewards such economic activities may 
Improvements in the financial 
sector and diversification of 
financial instruments are also 
beneficial for savers whose 
appetite is currently bound 
by the low real interest rates 
controlled by the central 
government. 
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speed up this process. By doing so, efficient 
allocation of capital among economic 
activities may be facilitated. Besides, most 
economists believe that a financial system 
better capable of risk management in 
an economy may also stimulate further 
improvements in corporate governance in 
the real sector firms. 
Improvements in the financial 
sector and diversification of financial 
instruments are also beneficial for savers 
whose appetite is currently bound by 
the low real interest rates controlled by 
the central government. No matter how 
much the volume of transactions in the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange 
markets have expanded, their combined 
share in the capital market is merely a 
quarter. The low level of diversification 
of financial assets and low real interest 
rates may urge the owners of capital to 
invest in stocks and real estate with a 
speculative motive. As a matter of fact, 
there was a large speculative bubble in 
China from 2005 to 2007 and at a lower 
scale later during 2009- 2010. In the 
former bubble, average stock prices lost 
about 70 % of their value compared to 
the peak within only a year and a half.39 
A similar movement also took place in 
housing and land prices though to a 
lesser degree. However, this reduction 
in prices was realized without a financial 
crisis, which implies that the central 
government has monitored and governed 
the process of bringing down these asset 
prices fairly well.40 
American economists frequently 
pronounce their expectations of 
a sudden crisis for China.41 They 
emphasize the structural problems in 
the Chinese economy that would lead 
to unsustainability of economic growth 
and finally a financial crisis. However, 
it should be reminded that the majority 
of these economists’ descriptions of the 
mechanism towards a financial crisis are 
based on theoretical economic work, 
albeit some few studies look at it from a 
political economy viewpoint and specific 
circumstances peculiar to China.
Concluding Remarks and 
Implications for Political 
Economy and Global 
Rebalancing
This article evaluates the economic 
growth performance of the Chinese 
economy. An important issue here is the 
political economy of growth. Some of 
the important economic decisions of the 
central government announced in the 
3rd Plenary Session of the 18th National 
Congress of the Chinese Communist 
Party in November 2013 were about 
how to sustain economic growth. The 
central government announced its desire 
to reinforce the market mechanism 
and to deepen the financial market by 
diversification of financial assets. Even 
then, the traditionally pragmatic stance 
of the government can be observed from 
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advanced economies, which also 
demanded from China to take the 
necessary measures to reform its 
economy to remedy the negative impacts 
these imbalances impose. Nicholas 
Lardy points out that the transition 
from investment-led to consumption-
led growth strategy in China will have an 
adverse effect on the financing of the US 
current account deficit. This is because 
the deficit was financed by capital inflows 
from China. Considering that the major 
cause of the US current account deficit is 
the low savings rate, it follows then that 
the US will have to increase its saving 
rate during China’s transition.44 
The global imbalances and rebalancing 
them are important issues for future 
economic growth in China. As required 
by the global rebalance, China’s role in 
the global economy needs to emphasize 
consumption rather than investment. 
Part of the increasing consumption will 
be channelled to imports, which may 
reduce the economic growth rate and 
employment in China. While the need 
to shift to consumption-led growth is 
the market-enhancing steps, without 
reducing the role of the state in the 
economic decision-making process, 
in measures introduced to improve 
property rights and relaxation of the 
one-child policy. Yet, the government’s 
strong hand in the financial sector, as 
evident from the large amounts of loans 
extended by the state-owned banks to 
state-owned enterprises and the resulting 
bad loans problem, as well as widespread 
corruption remain as major obstacles and 
limitations that the central government 
has to tackle.
An important aspect in conjunction 
with the global political economy is that 
national savings are larger than total 
investments in China because China 
is running a very large current account 
surplus by international standards. Excess 
savings are utilized by lending abroad, 
making China one of the top creditor 
countries. The top destination for lending 
is the US. This excess liquidity financed 
private consumption expenditures in the 
US especially before the financial crisis 
which broke out in 2007. Therefore, 
many American economists are inclined 
to blame China at least partially for the 
financial crisis.42 After the 2007-2008 
global financial crisis, global imbalances 
have become more apparent. Large current 
account surpluses by China and Germany, 
in particular, against the US have become 
important political issues as well.43 
China’s growth model based on 
investments was criticized by the 
While a shift towards 
consumption may ease the 
pressure on world prices of raw 
materials, there is still a need to 
invest in infrastructure in the 
urban areas in China.
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in infrastructure in the urban areas in 
China. Therefore, the expected reduction 
in the share of investments in GDP may 
not come that easily. However, this might 
have a positive impact on developing 
countries exporting raw materials to 
China.47 
The biggest impact on rebalancing 
China will be on East Asian economies. 
As Jörg Mayer puts it, these economies 
benefitted from their position in the 
global supply chains of American and 
Japanese multinational firms, especially 
in labour-intensive processes.48 Most of 
this output was exported to the industrial 
facilities of these foreign corporations 
in China. Rebalancing China will then 
affect these economies adversely as the 
demand for their products and services 
in the global supply chains will decline. 
Therefore, rebalancing may affect 
industrial development strategies in the 
region. In fact, the effects of rebalancing 
in East Asia became visible recently. The 
Economist reported in 2014 that a slow-
down in investment resulted in lower 
exports of Asian countries to China 
especially of commodities and raw 
materials, as well as machines.49 
admitted by the central government, 
the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015) 
did not mention how to shift China’s 
growth pattern away from investments, 
how to liberalize financial markets, 
or how to shift China’s global trade 
balance.45
The rebalancing in the Chinese 
economy toward consumption-led 
growth comes with costs to pay. When 
production was destined to investments 
and export to foreign markets, there 
was no need for Chinese companies to 
pay higher wages to their workers, as 
domestic consumption was relatively 
unimportant for the growth of these 
firms’ sales. In the 12th Five-Year Plan, 
the government emphasized sustainable 
economic growth in the long run along 
with increase in the welfare of the 
citizens, which implicitly assumes an 
increase in incomes and wages as well 
as improvements in the “soft” aspects of 
economic development, such as health 
and education.46 Household incomes will 
have to increase along with the growing 
middle class, and the social safety system 
will need to be improved. In addition, the 
slowdown in the labour force as a result 
of China’s strict population policy may 
help increase wages in the country and 
impact private consumption positively. 
Rebalancing China’s role this way 
will have global repercussions as well. 
While a shift towards consumption may 
ease the pressure on world prices of raw 
materials, there is still a need to invest 
China is slightly losing its 
comparative advantage in 
labour-intensive industries as 
the cost of labour has been rising 




in labour-intensive industries as the cost 
of labour has been rising much faster than 
that of the neighbouring Asian countries. 
While real wages increased by about 14 
% during the 2008-2011 period, this 
was far more than those in Thailand and 
Malaysia (4 %), the Philippines (less 
than 1 %) and Indonesia (about 1 %).52
It seems that China will stay at the 
centre of discussions circumventing the 
global imbalances and how to achieve 
sustainable growth at the global scale. 
This will probably be the main issue to 
be discussed in the G-20 meetings in the 
coming years. As the English proverb 
goes, only time will tell. 
There are opposing opinions about 
the future of China’s economic growth 
and its position in the global economy 
as well. Michael Pettis has foreseen 
that China’s investment boom is 
unsustainable and this would lead China 
to a long stagnation as happened in Japan 
after the burst of the bubble in 1991.50 
In addition, while shifting from the old 
growth model to the new growth model, 
it is important to bear in mind the risk of 
a hard landing. This happens when the 
engines of growth are fading and there 
are no new ones to substitute them. 
Rafael Halpin warns of such signs from 
some provinces.51 In addition, China is 
slightly losing its comparative advantage 
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